On May 30, 1967, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, declared the Republic of Biafra as an independent nation.
For Ojukwu’s detractors, his declaration was a rebellious move. However, for his fellow Igbos, it was a bold act of defiance; a desperate cry for justice and survival. But behind that historic declaration lay a web of pain, betrayal, and deepening mistrust that had been building for years.
So, why would a region choose to break away from the rest of the country? And what pushed Ojukwu to make such a high-stakes decision?
The 1966 Coups
On January 15, 1966, a group of young military officers, led by Majors Emmanuel Ifeajuna in Lagos and Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu in Kaduna, staged Nigeria’s first military coup. The coup resulted in the assassination of key political and military figures, including Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, and the Premier of the Western Region, Chief Ladoke Akintola. However, the coup failed to achieve nationwide success, as it was quickly suppressed in Lagos, even though it was successful in Kaduna.
Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, the highest-ranking officer in the Nigerian Army and an Igbo from the Eastern Region, assumed control of the government. Although he had not been part of the coup, his decision to consolidate power and suspend the constitution alarmed many, particularly in the Northern Region. His most controversial decision was the introduction of the Unification Decree No. 34, which sought to replace Nigeria’s federal structure with a unitary system.
This move was perceived by many Northerners as an attempt to impose Igbo dominance over the country. The belief that the January coup had favoured the Igbo ethnic group was further reinforced by the fact that most of its key plotters were left unpunished, while the majority of those killed in the coup were Northerners.
As resentment in the North grew, political and military elites in the region plotted their revenge. What followed was a violent reaction that would plunge Nigeria into chaos.
On the night of July 28, 1966, through the morning of July 29, 1966, a group of Northern officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Mohammed, Major Theophilus Danjuma, and other senior military figures staged a counter-coup against Aguiyi-Ironsi’s government. The coup was meticulously planned, and its primary objective was to avenge the January coup and cut off the North from the rest of the country.
Aguiyi-Ironsi, who was visiting the Western Region at the time, was captured in Ibadan alongside his host, the Military Governor of the Western Region, Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi. The two were taken into custody and dragged along in a convoy by Northern officers and subsequently executed in a brutal fashion. Aguiyi-Ironsi’s body was reportedly riddled with bullets before being buried in a shallow grave.
His death marked the collapse of Igbo authority within the military, and 72 hours later, Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, Aguiyi-Ironsi’s Chief of Staff and the most senior Northern officer in the Nigerian Army, was installed as the new Head of State on August 1, 1966.
The coup quickly turned into an orgy of violence, as Igbo officers in various military barracks across the country were hunted down and slaughtered. The killings were indiscriminate, with even Igbo soldiers who had no connection to the January coup becoming victims. The military purge soon spilt over into civilian life, leading to one of the worst pogroms in Nigerian history.
Following the success of the counter-coup, anti-Igbo sentiments reached a boiling point across Northern Nigeria. Between July and October 1966, a wave of ethnic violence swept through the region, targeting Igbo civilians and other Easterners. These attacks were systematic and brutal, with mobs descending on Igbo settlements, looting homes, setting properties ablaze, and killing men, women, and children indiscriminately.
The massacres were carried out with alarming efficiency, often with little to no intervention from the police or military authorities, many of whom were complicit in the violence. Trains and lorries carrying fleeing Easterners were ambushed, and entire families were wiped out in the attacks. Estimates of the death toll vary, but it has been reported that between 30,000 and 50,000 Igbo people and other Easterners were killed in the pogrom.[1] Some authors have quoted fewer than these figures. One quoted 10,000.[2]
The violence sent shockwaves through the Eastern Region, where millions of displaced survivors arrived with harrowing tales of murder and destruction. The scale of the killings and the government’s failure to protect its citizens further deepened the divide between the North and the East. It became increasingly clear that coexistence within the Nigerian federation had become untenable for many in the East, especially the military governor, Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, who threatened secession.
The Aburi Conference: A Turning Point in Nigeria’s Crisis
By late 1966, Ojukwu had grown increasingly wary of the Nigerian government, refusing to attend any meetings outside the East due to security concerns. In response, the Federal Government also insisted that Gowon should not travel to the Eastern Region, citing similar fears for his safety.
With the crisis escalating, Lieutenant-General Joseph Arthur Ankrah, Ghana’s Head of State, offered his country as a neutral ground for negotiations. Thus, on January 4, 1967, key military and political figures from Nigeria convened in Aburi, Ghana, in a last-ditch attempt to resolve the looming national crisis.
The Aburi meeting lasted two days and brought together prominent figures in Nigeria’s leadership. Among them were Head of State Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon and the Military Governors of the four regions: Hassan Usman Katsina (Northern Region), Robert Adeyinka Adebayo (Western Region), David Akpode Ejoor (Mid-Western Region), and Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (Eastern Region).
Others in attendance included the Military Administrator of Lagos, Brigadier Mobolaji Johnson, the Head of the Nigerian Navy, Commodore Joseph Edet Akinwale Wey, and the Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji Kam Salem, among others.
The significance of Aburi lay in the fact that the leaders had gathered at all, a sign that dialogue was still possible. However, beyond this symbolic achievement, the discussions touched on crucial issues: the restructuring of the Nigerian Army following the bloody counter-coup of July 1966, the subsequent ethnic violence that had engulfed the country, and, most importantly, the future of Nigeria’s unity.
One of the key issues raised by Ojukwu was the continued presence of Northern soldiers in the Western Region. He reminded Gowon that on August 9, 1966, the Head of State had promised that all soldiers would be returned to their regions of origin to ease ethnic tensions. However, while Eastern troops had been withdrawn from the North, Northern soldiers remained stationed in the West. Ojukwu saw this as a betrayal of the agreement and an imbalance that posed a significant threat to national stability.
Gowon, in his defence, argued that his directive had only applied to soldiers stationed in the North and the East. He insisted that the military presence in the West was necessary since the Nigerian Army had very few Yoruba officers.
This disagreement over military structure reflected a deeper divide: Ojukwu wanted the army reorganised on a regional basis, while Gowon was firmly opposed to the idea. The Eastern Governor also claimed that Nigeria no longer had a functioning central government. In his view, the country had effectively split into three separate sovereign entities—the Lagos-West-North Area, the Mid-West Area, and the East—following the July coup and its aftermath.
Gowon, however, rejected this assertion, insisting that Nigeria remained one united nation, with four regions under a central authority.
The most critical moment of the conference came when Ojukwu proposed that, given the ongoing crisis, the regions should “pull apart” temporarily to prevent further violence and bloodshed. He argued that this separation was necessary for peace, as it would allow each region to govern itself independently while efforts were made to rebuild trust.
Surprisingly, the other leaders agreed, seemingly unaware of the long-term implications of this concession. In approving Ojukwu’s suggestion, they had, in effect, sanctioned the secession of Biafra, thus undermining Nigeria’s existence as a single entity.
The Federal Delegation’s Miscalculation
The Nigerian delegation left Aburi with the belief that they had secured a path towards national unity. However, their approach to the conference had been woefully unprepared. Unlike Ojukwu, who arrived with a team of legal, political, and economic advisers, the Federal Government’s representatives had treated the talks as a casual dialogue among colleagues. They failed to grasp the full constitutional significance of what had been agreed upon.
Ojukwu, on the other hand, had been meticulous in his preparations. He understood that the Aburi Agreement, if implemented, would weaken the centre, giving the regions near-total autonomy. In effect, it laid the groundwork for a confederal system, which aligned perfectly with his vision for the East.
One of the most consequential clauses in the agreement was the decision that no single individual would serve as the Supreme Commander of the Nigerian Army, meaning there would be no recognised Head of State with full executive powers. Ojukwu had advocated for a system where national decisions would require unanimous approval from all regions before being implemented. This, in essence, would make any future Nigerian leader a mere figurehead, unable to act independently.
On returning to Nigeria, the full weight of the Aburi Agreement became clear to federal officials. The Permanent Secretaries of the various ministries convened on January 20, 1967, to assess the implications of what had been agreed. Their findings were alarming.
The agreement effectively weakened the central government, making the position of Head of State largely symbolic. The requirement for unanimous regional approval on key national appointments would paralyse federal governance.
The Federal Public Service would be rendered ineffective, as regional loyalties would supersede national allegiance. The conclusion was that Aburi had legitimised total regionalism, a move that could lead to outright disintegration. Gowon and his advisers were stunned by the realisation that they had given away too much, and the head of state had little choice but to renege on the terms. The Eastern Region, however, was determined to implement the agreement as signed. Ojukwu then set March 31, 1967, as the deadline for unilateral implementation, further escalating tensions.
Gowon, on the other hand, insisted that the constitutional changes proposed by the East were unworkable and would ultimately destroy Nigeria as a united entity. He argued that implementing Aburi would reduce the federal government to a mere administrative shell, incapable of holding the country together.
With neither side willing to back down, the fragile peace brokered at Aburi collapsed. Gowon’s refusal to implement the agreement deepened the rift between the Federal Government and the Eastern Region, pushing Nigeria closer to war.
But Gowon would play one last card to placate Ojukwu: Decree 8.
Decree 8
As the Federal Permanent Secretaries deliberated on the document they had endorsed, the Eastern Region, led by Ojukwu, remained steadfast in its demands. In response, the other military leaders took a decisive step on March 17, 1967, by enacting Decree 8. This legislation significantly increased the autonomy of the Regional Governments in an attempt to appease the East and prevent secession, thereby averting an impending war.
This decree, although an attempt to placate the East, fell short of Ojukwu’s expectations. His primary objection stemmed from provisions that reinforced the Federal Government’s supremacy, including its authority to declare a state of emergency in any Region with the consent of only three of the four Regional Governors, rather than a unanimous decision.
In defiance, Ojukwu set March 31, 1967, as the deadline for the unilateral implementation of the Aburi Accord. However, rather than formally seceding, the Eastern Region seized federal revenues from its territory.
Meanwhile, dissatisfaction brewed in the Western Region over the presence of Northern troops. Yoruba leaders, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, hinted at the possibility of the West seceding should the East do so. As the Federal Government grappled with these crises, Northern leaders proposed a radical solution—the creation of more states.
The call for state creation had long been resisted by the Northern political elite, and its sudden endorsement shocked the nation. The move was particularly welcomed by minority groups in the North and the East, including those from the Middle Belt and the Cross River-Ogoja-Rivers areas. Ojukwu, however, rejected the proposal, as it undermined his claim to represent the entire Eastern Region.
The Final Steps to Secession
With the West aligning with the Federal Government and the North advocating for state creation, the Eastern authorities escalated their actions. These included the seizure of £200,000 worth of produce from the Northern Region Marketing Board in Port Harcourt, the confiscation of railway stock and oil tankers, and the hijacking of a Nigerian Airways aircraft.
In response, the Federal Government imposed an economic blockade on the East in early May 1967. The situation deteriorated further when Ojukwu addressed the Eastern Consultative Assembly on May 26, presenting three options:
1. Accept Northern domination and submit to Gowon’s terms.
2. Continue the existing stalemate.
3. Assert the East’s autonomy.
The Assembly chose the third option and mandated Ojukwu to declare Eastern Nigeria an independent state to be known as the Republic of Biafra. Anticipating this move, Gowon declared a nationwide state of emergency on May 27, nullifying Decree 8. That same day, he announced the creation of 12 new states. The Northern Region was divided into six states: North-Western, North-Central, North-Eastern, Benue-Plateau, Kano, and Kwara. The Eastern Region was split into three: East-Central (Igbo heartland), Rivers, and Cross River. The Western Region was restructured, with Lagos and its surroundings forming Lagos State, while the remainder became Western State. The Midwest Region remained unchanged, but it was renamed Midwest State.
The creation of states effectively isolated the Igbo heartland, depriving it of access to the coastal oil reserves and key seaports. The move was a strategic masterstroke by the Federal Government, rendering the secessionists’ territorial claims untenable.[3] Nevertheless, on May 30, 1967, Ojukwu unilaterally declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra.
The new Republic of Biafra adopted its own flag, uniformed security forces, and a national anthem, which sounded like Sibelius’ Finlandia. For a month, tensions simmered without full-scale conflict. However, on July 6, 1967, the Federal Government launched what was initially termed a “police action” to quash the secession.
This quickly escalated into a full-blown civil war, exacerbated by Biafra’s ill-fated invasion of the Midwest Region on August 9.
The occupation of the Midwest, rather than bolstering Biafra’s position, proved disastrous. It triggered a swift and determined counter-offensive led by Lieutenant-Colonel Murtala Mohammed, marking a turning point in the war. The conflict dragged on for 30 brutal months, claiming over a million civilian lives and causing immense destruction.
Ultimately, Ojukwu fled, and the Republic of Biafra formally surrendered unconditionally on January 15, 1970.
The Road to Secession: Why Did Ojukwu Declare the Republic of Biafra in 1967?
The declaration of the Republic of Biafra on May 30, 1967, was not an impulsive act of rebellion but rather the peak of a complex and deeply rooted crisis. It was the result of years of political discord, ethnic tensions, military rivalries, and an ever-widening chasm of mistrust between the Eastern Region and the Federal Military Government. But was this secession inevitable, or could the Nigerian leadership have prevented the war that would ultimately claim over a million lives?
From left to right: Colonel E. Udeaja (parade commander), Wing Commander W. Ezeilo (Air Force Commander), Colonel S. Ogunewe (Military Aide to the Head of State), Major-General P. Efiong (Chief of Defence Staff), General O. Ojukwu (Head of State), Major-General A. Madiebo (Commander of the Biafran Army), Mr P. Okeke (Inspector General of Police) and Captain F. Anuku (Commander of the Biafran Navy).[4]
The Aburi Accord, which Ojukwu saw as the only pathway to peace, had been systematically eroded by Gowon’s reluctance to implement it in its entirety. Decree No. 8, which sought to decentralise power and appease the East, fell short of the Eastern Region’s expectations. While it granted significant autonomy to the regions, it also ensured that the Federal Government retained the authority to intervene, declare emergencies, and suppress any separatist ambitions. Could Ojukwu have accepted a compromise, or was his position already cemented by the unfolding events?
Beyond the political and constitutional manoeuvres, economic factors played a decisive role. The Eastern Region, blessed with oil wealth, sought greater control over its resources, especially in light of the Federal Government’s economic blockade. How could a region so crucial to Nigeria’s economy be expected to remain subservient to a central authority it no longer trusted? Moreover, the scars of the 1966 pogroms, where thousands of Easterners were massacred in the North, had left an indelible mark on the psyche of the Ndigbo. Could they ever again feel safe in a united Nigeria, or had their fate already been sealed by the tragic events of the preceding months?
Ojukwu’s declaration of the Republic of Biafra was, in his mind, a necessity; a final act of defiance against a system that, in his view, had consistently marginalised and endangered his people. To him, the East had no choice but to assert its autonomy in order to ensure its survival. Yet, did he fully anticipate the scale of the Federal Government’s response? Did he believe that the Republic of Biafra, cut off from international recognition and facing an economic blockade, could withstand the might of the Nigerian state?
In the end, history tells us that the Republic of Biafra was short-lived, succumbing to the brutal reality of war after 30 months of intense conflict. But even after Biafra’s surrender on January 15, 1970, the questions remain: was secession truly the only viable option for the East? Could diplomacy have yielded a different outcome? Or was Nigeria’s unity, however fragile, always destined to be preserved by force rather than consensus?
Well, these questions remain to be answered, and the lessons from the unfolding events have been recorded. However, it is for future generations to decide whether those lessons will be heeded or ignored.
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References
- [1] Chukwu-Kweleze Iloegbunam, Ironsi: Nigeria, The Army, Power and Politics (Eminent Biographies, Awka, 2019), p. 206.
- [2] John de St. Jorre, The Brothers’ War: Biafra and Nigeria (Faber and Faber Ltd, London, 1972), p. 86.
- [3] Anthony Okion Ojigbo, 200 Days to Eternity: The Administration of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed (Tokion Company, Lagos, 1979), p. 132.
- [4] Alexander A. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and The Biafran War: The Aftermath (Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd, Enugu, 1980), p. 327.