Aburi Agreement: How Ojukwu Outsmarted Gowon

Aburi Agreement: How Ojukwu Outsmarted Gowon in January 1967

Virtually everything discussed at Aburi is still relevant in today’s Nigeria.

The date was January 5, 1967. At the time, the wobbling nation of Nigeria was on the brink of collapse, and a historic meeting known as the Aburi Agreement was convened in the serene hills of Aburi, Ghana.

With ethnic tensions boiling over, massacres in the North claiming thousands of Igbo lives, and the fragile federation on the verge of disintegration, the two leaders—Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu and Yakubu Gowon—faced off in a battle of wits. The world watched as this high-stakes dialogue sought to avert an impending civil war and redefine the future of Nigeria.

At the end of the two-day retreat, Ojukwu came out on top and outsmarted Gowon who agreed to the letter all of Ojukwu’s proposals on the way forward to a new Nigeria. However, Gowon was oblivious to what he had signed away in Aburi. When he returned to Lagos, he realised his folly when the permanent secretaries opened his eyes to his agreements with Ojukwu.

No doubt, Ojukwu had won the first battle at Aburi. But Gowon who felt he had been robbed would not give in and sought to reach a compromise. Of course, he did not cancel all of the Aburi agreements but he inserted some clauses, which he called Decree 8, to keep the East in the federation while, at the same time, not granting all of Ojukwu’s demands.

On Aburi we stand,” Ojukwu vowed from Enugu.

From Aburi you shall fall,” Gowon responded in Lagos.

Thus began a back-and-forth battle of dialogues that would eventually render the Aburi Agreement null and void and lead to a brutal 30-month civil war which claimed millions of lives.

How did Ojukwu outsmart Gowon at Aburi? First, let us examine the root cause.

The Road to Aburi

The year 1966 marked a watershed moment in Nigerian history, defined by two military coups that upended the country’s fragile post-independence order and set the stage for the Aburi Agreement. These events, driven by ethnic tensions, political rivalries, and a struggle for power, plunged Nigeria into a period of uncertainty and division, ultimately culminating in the Nigerian Civil War. To understand the necessity and significance of the Aburi Agreement, one must first probe into the genesis of these coups and their far-reaching consequences.

Nigeria, having gained independence from Britain in 1960, inherited a federal system plagued by regionalism and ethnic divisions. The country’s three dominant ethnic groups—the Hausa and Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West, and the Igbo in the East—each sought to protect their regional interests, often at the expense of national unity. The First Republic (1963–1966) was characterised by political corruption, electoral malpractices, and a lack of accountability. These issues reached a tipping point in the controversial 1964 general elections and the October 1965 Western Regional elections, which were widely perceived as rigged, leading to widespread discontent, riots and killings. A situation then known as Operation Wetie.

Amidst this political chaos, a group of young junior military officers in the Nigerian Army, led predominantly by Igbo officers such as Major Patrick Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, staged a coup on January 15, 1966. The coup was ostensibly aimed at eradicating corruption and restoring order. However, it quickly took on an ethnic dimension due to the disproportionate targeting of Northern and Western political and military leaders.

Among those killed were Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, Premier of the Western Region, as well as Chief Festus Samuel Okotie-Eboh, the Minister of Finance.

In contrast, Igbo leaders, such as President Nnamdi Azikiwe and Michael Okpara, the Premier of the Eastern Region, were left unscathed. Also, Chief Dennis Osadebey, the Premier of the Mid-West Region, survived the coup untouched. This selective nature of the killings sowed seeds of mistrust and resentment among the Northern elite.

In the wake of the coup, Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo army officer, and the most senior military officer at the time, assumed power as Head of State. While Aguiyi-Ironsi’s government sought to stabilise the nation, his policies inadvertently worsened ethnic tensions. His decision to abolish the federal structure in favour of a unitary system—through Decree No. 34—was perceived by many Northerners as an attempt to consolidate Igbo dominance. This perception, coupled with the absence of swift justice for the coup plotters, deepened Northern grievances.

The discontent in the North culminated in a counter-coup on July 29, 1966, often referred to as the “July Rematch.” Northern officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Murtala Mohammed and others, sought to avenge the deaths of their leaders and redress what they saw as Igbo hegemony. The coup resulted in the brutal assassination of General Aguiyi-Ironsi, alongside other Igbo officers, and the installation of Lieutenant-Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Northern Christian, as Head of State.

Unlike the January coup, the July coup unleashed widespread violence. Pogroms against Igbo people erupted across the Northern Region, with thousands of Easterners brutally killed and many more displaced. These massacres triggered a mass exodus of Igbos back to the Eastern Region, where they sought refuge under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region.

The events of 1966 created an atmosphere of deep mistrust between the regions. The Eastern Region, under Ojukwu, increasingly viewed the Federal Military Government as incapable of ensuring the safety and rights of Easterners. Meanwhile, Gowon faced immense pressure from Northern leaders and military officers who demanded a stronger stance against what they perceived as Igbo insubordination.

Ojukwu’s demands for justice and the safety of Eastern Nigerians were met with resistance from Gowon’s government, which was preoccupied with holding the country together. The absence of a clear chain of command further complicated matters, as Ojukwu and Gowon often operated as equals rather than subordinates within a unified government. This impasse deepened the division, with the Eastern Region increasingly asserting its autonomy.

By late 1966, the situation had reached a boiling point. Amid fears of an all-out civil war, the need for dialogue became urgent. The international community, particularly Ghana’s Head of State, Lieutenant-General Joseph Ankrah, stepped in to mediate. It was agreed that a high-level meeting of Nigeria’s military leaders would take place in a neutral venue – Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967.

The Aburi meeting was intended as a last-ditch effort to salvage Nigeria’s unity. The goal was to address the political, military, and constitutional issues threatening the federation. Both sides entered the talks with differing objectives: Ojukwu sought regional autonomy to protect the Eastern Region, while Gowon aimed to preserve Nigeria as a unified state. The stage was set for a negotiation that would determine the fate of a nation.

Aburi Agreement: Ojukwu’s Tactics, Strategy, and Manoeuvering

The Aburi meeting started on January 4, 1967, and lasted two days. Aburi was as much a battle of intellect and strategy as it was a diplomatic negotiation. Ojukwu entered the talks with a meticulously crafted strategy to secure his region’s interests. His approach at Aburi showcased his deep understanding of Nigeria’s political landscape, his ability to exploit his rivals’ weaknesses, and his skill in navigating the complexities of negotiation.

Ojukwu’s preparation for the Aburi meeting was both comprehensive and strategic. He immersed himself in Nigeria’s constitutional history, particularly the regional autonomy enshrined in the Constitution of the First Republic. Armed with this knowledge, he was able to articulate his position with clarity and legal precision, framing his demands within the context of Nigeria’s foundational agreements. While Gowon attended the meeting without adequate preparations in terms of a crew of legal and political advisers which such a meeting demanded, Ojukwu, on the other hand, meant business. He arrived in Aburi with a strong team of legal, political, and economic advisers, secretaries, and realms of paper.

With these, he was able to outsmart Gowon, especially in his ability to frame the Eastern Region’s grievances in terms that resonated beyond ethnic boundaries. He portrayed the Eastern Region’s push for autonomy not as an act of secession but as a legitimate response to systemic injustices and a means to safeguard the lives and property of Easterners. This narrative positioned him as a defender of his people’s rights rather than a rebel, garnering sympathy and understanding from neutral observers.

emeka-ojukwu
Ojukwu taught Murtala Muhammed infantry tactics and military law in Teshie, Ghana. Student fought teacher during the Civil War.

During the negotiations, Ojukwu demonstrated an exceptional command of language and rhetoric. He deliberately emphasised terms such as “devolution of power” and “regional autonomy,” which were less likely to provoke alarm than “secession” or “independence.” This careful choice of words allowed him to present his proposals as reasonable and consistent with Nigeria’s federal structure, making it difficult for Gowon and his delegation to outright reject them.

For instance, Ojukwu used the words “drawing apart” instead of “secession” when he proposed the standalone of Regions in other to avoid further friction and further killings. The other leaders who all wanted “One Nigeria” agreed to Ojukwu’s proposal without understanding the implications because Ojukwu masked his words.

A cornerstone of Ojukwu’s strategy was his emphasis on decentralisation. He proposed that each region should have control over its resources, security, and governance, effectively reducing the powers of the central government. This proposal appealed to the principle of federalism and aligned with the historical demands of other regions, particularly the Western Region.

Ojukwu was acutely aware of Gowon’s vulnerabilities, particularly his relative inexperience and the divided loyalties within the Federal Military Government. Gowon’s position as Head of State was not entirely secure, as he faced pressure from Northern hardliners and other military factions. Ojukwu capitalised on this by adopting a firm but non-confrontational tone, forcing Gowon to carefully weigh his responses to avoid alienating key stakeholders.

By exploiting Gowon’s ignorance, Ojukwu had got what he wanted. He had outsmarted Gowon and this was the bombshell of the Aburi Agreement.

The Aburi Agreement reflected many of Ojukwu’s demands recognising the principle of regional autonomy and proposing a framework that would grant significant powers to Nigeria’s regions. For Ojukwu, this was a major tactical victory, as it provided a legal and moral basis for the Eastern Region’s push for autonomy.

Although Ojukwu had outsmarted Gowon at the negotiation table and won the battle at Aburi, he would face another battle back home in Nigeria when Gowon, after his eyes were opened to how he had signed away the country in Ghana, reneged on the agreement and refused to fully implement the Aburi Agreement, setting the stage for a 30-month civil war.

Historical Legacy of the Aburi Agreement

Virtually everything discussed at Aburi is still relevant in today’s Nigeria.

The Aburi Agreement, signed in January 1967 in Aburi, Ghana, represents a critical yet ultimately unsuccessful effort to avert the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). Its historical legacy is both profound and cautionary, offering insights into the complexities of political negotiations in deeply divided societies. The Aburi Agreement and its aftermath underscore the importance of mutual trust, clear communication, and effective implementation mechanisms in high-stakes negotiations.

The Aburi Agreement arose amidst escalating tensions following Nigeria’s post-independence crises, particularly the 1966 coups, ethnic massacres, and the displacement of millions of Eastern Nigerians, primarily the Igbo people. These events culminated in the secessionist ambitions of the Eastern Region, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu. Seeking to prevent a civil war, representatives of the Nigerian federal government and the Eastern Region convened in Aburi under the auspices of Ghana’s military leader, General Joseph Ankrah.

Aburi outlined agreements on key issues, including decentralisation of power, military restructuring, and measures to protect the Eastern Region. It proposed a confederal structure, granting the regions significant autonomy while maintaining the unity of Nigeria. The Aburi Agreement seemed promising, with both parties expressing satisfaction at the end of the talks.

However, the implementation faltered due to differing interpretations and mutual distrust. The federal government, led by General Yakubu Gowon, viewed the confederal provisions as threatening national unity and sovereignty. Conversely, Ojukwu and the Eastern leadership perceived subsequent federal actions as a betrayal of the Aburi Agreement. This breakdown in trust and communication exacerbated the already fragile situation, eventually leading to the declaration of the Republic of Biafra and the onset of the Nigerian Civil War.

The failure to implement the Aburi Agreement highlights a critical missed opportunity to address Nigeria’s political and ethnic divisions peacefully. The inability of both sides to commit to the agreed terms underscored the fragility of negotiated settlements in an atmosphere of deep-seated mistrust. The Aburi Agreement introduced a framework that recognised the value of regional autonomy in addressing Nigeria’s ethnic and regional diversity. Although the war nullified its implementation, the debates it sparked influenced subsequent constitutional developments, including the federal restructuring clamour for today.

Why the Aburi Agreement Failed

The failure of the Aburi Agreement weakened trust in dialogue as a conflict-resolution mechanism, setting a precedent for scepticism towards future political agreements in Nigeria. The perception of betrayal fostered a narrative of distrust that lingers in Nigerian politics.

Instead of resolving tensions, the collapse of the Aburi Agreement further polarised the parties involved. It provided a justification for the Eastern Region’s secession and underscored the federal government’s determination to preserve the country’s unity at all costs.

The Aburi Accord - Aburi Agreement
By exploiting Gowon’s ignorance, Ojukwu got what he wanted. He had outsmarted Gowon and this was the bombshell of the Aburi Agreement.

The Aburi Agreement remains a reference point in discussions about conflict resolution in Africa, particularly in multi-ethnic states. It demonstrates the perils of negotiations conducted without robust mechanisms for implementation and conflict de-escalation.

Effective negotiations require precise agreements with clear terms that all parties interpret uniformly. The ambiguity in the Aburi Agreement’s provisions allowed for conflicting interpretations, undermining its effectiveness.

Mutual trust is essential in negotiations. The Nigerian context of ethnic rivalries and historical grievances made trust-building challenging, but its absence proved fatal to the Accord’s success.

The role of Ghana as a host was significant, but the process lacked a neutral third-party mediator who could actively facilitate dialogue, resolve disputes, and ensure adherence to agreements. Political agreements must include practical steps and clear timelines for implementation, along with mechanisms for resolving disputes that arise during execution. The lack of such provisions in the Aburi Agreement contributed to its failure.

Aburi’s focus on decentralisation reflected an attempt to address Nigeria’s diversity but failed to adequately account for the federal government’s concerns about unity. Negotiations must balance regional aspirations with national interests. It underscores the importance of proactive measures to de-escalate conflicts. Early action to implement agreements and maintain dialogue could have prevented the situation from deteriorating into war.

The Aburi Agreement stands as a sad reminder of the complexities inherent in resolving political disputes in deeply divided societies. While it represented a significant effort to address Nigeria’s political crisis, its failure exemplifies the pitfalls of inadequate implementation, ambiguous agreements, and mutual distrust. For modern Nigeria and other multi-ethnic states, the lessons of the Aburi Accord remain relevant, emphasising the need for inclusive, transparent, and sustainable approaches to political negotiations and conflict resolution.

Ojukwu’s approach at Aburi was a masterclass in negotiation and strategic thinking. Through meticulous preparation, astute vocabulary, and an ability to exploit his rivals’ weaknesses, he secured agreements that advanced the interests of the Eastern Region.

Although Ojukwu might have outsmarted Gowon in Ghana, the failure of the Federal Government to honour the accord underscored the challenges of achieving lasting solutions in a deeply divided nation. The Aburi Agreement, while a tactical triumph for Ojukwu, ultimately became another chapter in Nigeria’s journey towards a brutal civil war.

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